example, they know that liberty of conscience exists in their society and that apostasy is not a legal crime, all this is to ensure that their continued membership when they come of age is not based simply on ignorance of their basic rights or fear of punishment for offenses that do not exist. Moreover, their education should also prepare them to be fully cooperating members of a society and enable them to be self-supporting; it should also encourage the political virtues so that they want to honor the fair terms of social cooperation in their relations with the rest of society (Rawls 1996, p.199 . See also Rawls 2001, p.156) .
As Rawls elaborates in a later restatement, this education should promote respect for each other as equals as part of a capacity for a 'sense of justice', as well as inculcating the virtues of reasonableness, a sense of fairness, and a spirit of compromise (Rawls 2001 , p.116. See also Bell 2004 . What, exactly, these things might unpack to mean is the focus of the last section of this piece. Nevertheless, we should note that these are necessary components of a political liberal educational curriculum. Whilst these aspects are compulsory, it does not follow that these are the only things that can be taught. Beyond these aspects, political liberalism leaves room for families, communities, and schools to determine the content of how their children are educated. This is likely to vary significantly across schools, as we see with schools that promote particular religious faiths, or philosophical positions, or even an environmentalist ethic.
Whilst there is, perhaps, space for the inclusion of environmental concerns in the classroom, this is likely to jar considerably with defenders of environmentalism who view mechanisms for changing attitudes, preferences, and behaviours as necessary for resolving serious ecological problems (with potentially catastrophic consequences) not as a voluntarily adopted educational ethi for some schools -as Catholicism or Islam might be adopted as a wider educational aimbut as a core mandatory component of education for every school child.
On the face of things, political liberalism and environmentalism are radically incompatible (see Dobson 2001, p. vii for examples). The latter is ordinarily conceived of as a world view, a conception of the good; the very thing that political liberalism eschews appeal to, and attempts to steer a neutral path between. Although it comes in many forms, at its core, environmentalism is committed to the improvement of the health of the environment and its repair and conservation. In particular, this includes concerns of nonhuman entities and elements, and the proper relationship or balance between human life and the various natural systems upon which it depends. Typically, defences of these 'green' values go beyond the minimalism of political liberalism and constitute a more 'comprehensive' or perfectionist political doctrine -one that affirms a certain picture of what the good life consists of. Views vary, of course, but the trajectory away from political liberalism's eschewing of such commitments is, prima facie, clear.
This has implications for education, and these implications are not modest. The thoroughgoing reform of values such aims would require would necessitate educational mechanisms for attempting to create green citizens with the knowledge and skills to protect the environment, or save the Earth, from the deleterious effects of the kinds of processes liberalism is often thought to engender. This would include such things as the capacities to make environmentally aware decisions, the capacity to understand scientific evidence, and to bring political, economic, and deliberative resources to bear on specific issues. It would require a less individualistic or atomistic ethos than is ordinarily considered to be a mainstay of liberal conceptions of political morality. As the UNESCO report from the 1977 Intergovernmental Conference on Environmental Education -which Bell cites in his recent consideration of this question -states, environmental education must be both universal, comprehensive, and holistic (UNESCO 1979, pp.12-14) . That is, it must apply to all children and all school curricula everywhere; it must cover the full range of environmental issues that threaten the planet and life on it; and it must draw in many educational disciplines, from sciences to social sciences, arts, and humanities. The aim is not simply to transmit the right attitudes, but to develop the capacity of children to actively think in a pro-environmentalist manner for themselves; to give them exposure to issues, and the necessary critical tools and experiential resources to work through the issues in a sophisticated manner, as well as to extrapolate to new issues as they arise. If the public are to be guardians of the environment, then they will require the proper educational background to later enact the policies necessary to save the planet. As Bell writes:
If the aim is to protect the environment by creating new generations of citizens, who are 'greener' than their parents and grandparents, it will not be enough to make environmental education an entitlement. It is only by making it compulsory that we can ensure that 'everyone becomes environmentally conscious through proper environmental education'. Environmental education must be 'an essential part of every pupil's curriculum ' (Bell 2004, p.43, citing Palmer and Neal 1994, pp.14 and 28 respectively. Footnote omitted).
I wish to elaborate and defend the claim that political liberalism and a serious environmentalism are, contrary to first appearances, in large part compatible. Not all environmentalist concerns or educational aspirations are realisable under political liberalism, but the most central ones -more so than rival attempts at reconciliation allow -are. Several possibilities or routes to achieving this reconciliation are possible. I will give these brief consideration, and reasons that count against them, before moving to the positive argument in the next section.
One tactic, presented by (amongst others) Baxter (2000; 2005; 2006) , is to broaden the foundations of anti-perfectionist versions of political morality to include nonhuman entities as part of the 'community' of entities to whom justice is owed. This solution seeks to guarantee the inclusion of certain ecological aspects in any outcomes agreed to in the initial contractualist framework that stands at the root of views such as political liberalism by including parties with those interest as part of the original contract. Whilst for Rawls the contracting parties are humans, Baxter adds much of nonhuman nature whose interests (like those of other 'inarticulate' groups such as the severely disables) are represented by proxy.
Such a view has the ability (if correct) of building a very strong ecological position into the political liberal-type framework. In terms of education it would likely mandate considerable and radical revision of a national curriculum to include a wide range of activities and learning about the protection of entities that are considered fellow citizens in a common project.
I wish to set this position aside, for I have argued against it at length elsewhere (*** self reference deleted ***). We need only note that it does not provide an answer to our current predicament because it undermines the neutrality of political liberalism. Admitting nonhuman entities into the community of justice may be possible, but it does so at the cost of creating two competing versions of political liberalism. Political liberalism was supposed to provide a neutral framework for steering between different comprehensive conceptions of the good, and an agreed set of procedures that allowed wider policy questions outside of matters of basic justice to be resolved fairly. As Baxter acknowledges, the upshot of his argument is now two versions of a neutralist framework -one with nonhuman entities included, one with only human entities included -and no agreed upon criteria for choosing which is correct (Baxter 2000, p.62) .
Incorporating ecological concerns in this way has simply pushed the issue back one level of philosophical abstraction. It does not solve the problem so much as deepen it.
A second response -one touched upon by Bell (2004, p.40) -is one that attempts to 'avoid' the problem by suggesting that the essential curriculum mandated by political liberalism is more expansive than it appears at first sight, and is likely to include a good deal of the environmentalist's concerns and points. Bell suggests this is inadequate because it implies the national curriculum would be almost wholly occupied with the task of creating 'good citizens' and this curriculum would be compulsory across all schools. 'Accepting this 'solution' seems to undermine the idea of political liberalism as a "module, an essential constituent part, that fits into and can be supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endure in the society regulated by [the principles of political liberalism]". ' (Bell 2004 , p.40, quoting Rawls 1993 Interpolation in Bell).
Bell's dismissal of this option is too quick. It does not follow that a wider understanding of the role of a political liberal education will eat up the entire national curriculum. I will take this up in the next section where I argue that educating about justice is part of the political liberal position on education, and many environmental concerns and ideals form part of any acceptable conception of socioeconomic justice. Before proceeding, I wish to consider one final option which is endorsed by Bell in his recent exploration of this question (2004).
Rawls's statement about education in a political liberal society includes the encouraging of the 'political virtues' so that citizens may play a fully cooperative role in their society (Rawls 1996, p.199) . Bell argues that these political virtues are likely to include certain environmentalist virtues, though only a limited amount. Noting that Rawls's account requires a 'just savings principle' to meet the requirements of justice to future generations in order to realise and preserve a just society, Bell suggests that this will include a conception of 'sustainability' (Rawls 1999, p.257; Bell 2004, p.46) . Admittedly, this may not be a particularly 'green' conception of sustainability or sustainable development, because Rawls's conception is not committed to anything so specific, but might well be compatible with it. Wissenberg's (1998) infamous 'global Manhattan' -rather than a world of open green spaces -may be a plausible option for satisfying the Rawlsian-based notion of sustainability for achieving a decent standard of living through social cooperation within a society that exists across generations.
What sustainability will require is, therefore, to be determined by citizens through informed discussion. Such informed discussion is predicated upon an education sufficient to allow serious contemplation and deliberation about such matters. 'In addition to promoting "political virtues", which are designed to ensure intra-generational justice, the [political liberal] curriculum should aim to promote "sustainability virtues", which are designed to ensure inter-generational justice.' (Bell 2004, p.47 ). And, '[i]n short, the [political liberal] curriculum should aim to promote a positive attitude toward "sustainability" and a basic understanding of the environmental and social science frameworks that citizens need to participate in "sustainability" decisions. ' (Bell 2004, p.47) .
Whilst this response is promising in terms of widening the understanding of political virtues to include a more environmental slant, it expands it in the wrong direction, and it leaves too much out that might otherwise be included. Relying on the just savings principle raises the controversial issue of Rawls's position on intergenerational justice, and the difficulties this conception brings. In the next section I will argue that there are more straightforward parts of Rawls's conception of intra-generational justice that do in fact cover many environmental concerns and virtues. Moreover, this solution leaves the vast majority of environmental issues to be settled by democratic procedures, and the wider content of the educational curriculum to be determined by the preferences of the society. If environmental concerns are to be addressed by public policy or 'green ideals' are to form part of children's education, then (beyond the sustainability virtues) this is permissible if enough citizens can be convinced of their value. In this sense, green ideals remain a conception of the good, the merits of which are to be debated and haggled over in the political process by an informed citizenry. If enough people can be convinced -as they may be convinced by the worth of other features of other conceptions of the good such as prayers in schools -then these ideals may permissibly be instituted. If not, not.
Proponents of environmental justice are likely to be dissatisfied with this conclusion. The point is that environmental issues are so fundamental to human (and other) life and flourishing, that they are matters of justice, and not simply preferences to be argued over in public debate, to be adopted or not adopted as a society sees fit. In this they differ from conceptions of the good, such as religious doctrines. Much of the environmentalist position is conceived of by its defenders as matters of justice, not of the good. It is to a defence of this position that I now turn.
II
In the face of reasonable pluralism, Rawlsian political liberalism defends an anti-perfectionist position, rather than affirming the truth or falsity of any particular view or views of the good. By contrast, however, Rawls also defends a non-neutral position with regard to socioeconomic matters of justice.
4 Indeed, Rawls defends a non-neutral and rather specific set of socioeconomic resources -his 'primary social goods' -as a requirement of justice. These goods include not only rights and liberties (to freedom of speech, association, and so forth), but to opportunities (to positions of advantage), and to a specific distribution of wealth and income that arises from the differential positions of advantage and the employment of talents. Anti-perfectionism is strictly limited to certain areas (questions of the good), and is not intended to apply across the board (questions of how resources ought to be distributed). Issues of fair resource division are not something to be argued over within democratic institutions on the basis of deliberation or preferences. Rawls's second principle of justice, which is intended to shape the basic structure of society on such matters, makes this clear:
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to The difference principle prioritises the position of the least advantaged in the distribution of particular resources (wealth and income) and provides a guarantee of a level of these resources that will enable individuals to make full use of their rights, liberties, and opportunities in the pursuit of their particular conception of the good (whatever that turns out to be). Something like the difference principle is, according to Rawls, a necessary component of any reasonable conception of justice.
It is these resources -primary social goods -and their governing principles of distributionRawls's principles of justice -that provides the point of embarkation for my argument that a wide range of environmental goods and concerns can be included within the framework of basic justice, rather than treated as matters of the good. I will argue that environmental goods, that is, are more appropriately conceived in the same manner as Rawls's other primary goods, or as goods that contribute to them.
Rawls describes primary social goods as those resources that, whatever else we need in life, we need these in order to frame, revise, and pursue a conception of the good. The link between certain environmental goods and the primary goods is so obvious in cases such as breathable air that their provision is beyond question. Without breathable air the primary goods of rights, liberties, opportunities, and so forth would be pointless. Yet, many environmental goods will Maintaining a decent environment will be central to leading the decent lives that the goods provided as a matter of justice are intended to allow us to achieve. Securing and protecting areas of natural beauty, saving endangered species and protecting others, purifying our air and water, maintaining a delicately balanced ecosystem with all its essential parts, all of these and more are essential to this task. Because of the degree of interconnectedness of these various aspects (and our ignorance of how they fit together exactly), many will require the protection of other aspects.
Purifying air and water to a sufficient level (and then maintaining it) is, upon closer inspection, an incredibly multifaceted task that extends from stemming carbon emissions, through preventing the destruction of the rain forests, to maintaining the delicate balance of flora and fauna in the oceans. This is often overlooked when simply talking of limiting pollution and purifying air as a component of basic justice. Once we begin to view environmental goods as crucial to securing justice, then many crucial parts of our ecosystem will require protection as Similarly, current research consistently shows that the vast majority of environmental pollutants produced by industry are produced in the most socially and economically deprived areas (see Stephens et al 2001) . '[W]ithout clean air many people will suffer debilitating respiratory illnesses that prevent them from engaging in "mutually beneficial social cooperation" (e.g., working) and from pursuing their conception of the good.' (Bell 2004b, pp.298-9). As we have seen, even meeting these basic requirements is an extensive task, requiring far-reaching policies and actions.
The preservation of various species of animals and plants, the reduction of various activities, are all likely to be included. Attaining clean air requires not simply the reduction of emissions but the preservation of parts of the ecosystem -such as various strains of plankton and algae in the seas -that absorb CO 2 , and various fish and mammals for which these form vital foodstuffs and which manage the stocks of these organisms.
If I am somewhere near correct in this -that many environmental goods and concerns are rightly seen as crucial to the provision of the all-purpose means (primary goods) for pursuing a conception of the good that are guaranteed as part of an acceptable conception of justice within
Rawlsian political liberalism -then this will have equally reformatory consequences for what can be taught in schools as part of a basic political liberal curriculum. As well as the abilities of critical thinking and sensitivity to balancing evidence and so forth, the political values will also include teaching and learning about how the environment impacts upon the rights, liberties, and opportunities that citizens are guaranteed within political liberal society. The link between such aspects and reciprocity and the 'fair terms of social cooperation' can also be made explicit. These aspects are, moreover, compulsory as part of the basic curriculum of teaching about justice, rather than an optional part outside of the basic political liberal national curriculum. The only question this raises is whether teaching about justice in this way is compatible with Rawls's statement about education. I consider this -along with other criticisms -in the next section.
III
I have argued that many aspects of environmental justice are more appropriately considered as matters pertaining to or impinging upon the provision of primary goods, rather than questions of the good life. As such, they are not matters that the political liberal society need remain neutral
over. An educational curriculum within such a society must include knowledge of such features within its remit. In this, many environmental view and the goods that they endorse will be markedly different in qualitative terms than, say, religious views. The latter makes claims about the good life, whilst the former make a different type of claim: that certain goods are essential for pursuing a conception of the good, whatever that turns out to be. We might disagree over the exact nature of these goods, but these are disagreements about justice, not the good. This raises two immediate questions, or potential objections. I turn now to consider these.
The first issue concerns the nature of disagreements over the good and disagreements over Trading laws, fox hunting, or the place of the arts in a worthwhile life (Caney 1999, pp.22-23) .
5
This leaves me, then, with the following dilemma:
Either:
(1) We admit that reasonable disagreement applies to questions of justice and retract a partisan commitment to any principles of (re)distribution as a component part of a just framework;
opportunities are empty, for the realization of their full worth is tied to the level of resources that the individuals holding them have. Rawls lists a few concrete items that, as a minimum, this would require: the public financing of elections, equality of opportunity, a decent distribution of income, society to act as the employer of last resort, and basic healthcare for all citizens (Rawls 1996, pp.lviii-lix) . To this, I have argued, we should add a swathe of environmental goods that are prerequisites for many of the items Rawls lists.
The reciprocity requirement means that views such as Nozick's (1978) libertarianism, for example, fails to be reasonable in the appropriate sense because it denies certain all-purpose resources as necessarily accompanying liberties in order that people can make full use of them, and claims instead that the unfettered market is the appropriate mechanism for setting the baseline distribution of such resources. Whilst Nozick's view does not depend on any particular conception of the good -his claims about self-ownership and private property rest on a conception of what we may legitimately do (or not do) to one another, not on a conception of what makes life valuable -and is a political conception in that sense, it is not a liberal conception because it fails to meet the reciprocity criterion. Liberal conceptions, according to Rawls, are uniquely placed to meet the requirements of reciprocity because only such conceptions display a sufficient level of concern for the advantage of every individual (see Rawls 1996: lviii).
The response here, then, is not to deny the existence of disagreement about distributive justice, but to point to the fact that most actual disagreement is unreasonable, and thereby irrelevant. That is, the scope of disagreement about distributive justice is significantly narrowed once it is recognised that it is only disagreement between reasonable views that is of importance.
Reasonable disagreement will occur (albeit amongst a narrower range of views) over which principle best fulfils the reciprocity requirement. To show a sufficient level of concern for the advantage of every individual such a principle must be, to some extent, egalitarian in nature.
Within the Rawlsian theory the difference principle is one possible principle from a set of such principles. Moreover, Rawls believes it to be the most appropriate principle for the task of fulfilling the reciprocity requirement (Rawls 1996, p.xlix; Quong 2011, pp.204-12) .
Drawing out this dilemma and response has also provided another means by which to indicate the profound consequences for education of the view I have outlined and defended. The aim of a political liberal education for citizenship -as encapsulated in Rawls's statement of encouraging 'the political virtues so that they want to honor the fair terms of social cooperation in their relations with the rest of society' (Rawls 1996, p.199 ) -must be to develop in citizens an commitment to democratic deliberation that is constrained or framed by both the virtues of civility (a recognition of the burdens of judgment) and an understanding of the significant social and economic requirements of reciprocity (Clayton 2006, p.150 ). This will necessarily include an understanding of the place and role of environmental goods and requirements that contribute to those social and economic resources. 'Just as children should be educated to abhor law and policy that discriminates on racial or sexual grounds, they should also be brought to appreciate the injustice of political ideologies that do not afford citizens the right kinds of concern or respect. ' (Clayton 2006, p.150) . Libertarian views that fails to offer health, opportunity, wealth and income, is one case in point. Views that relegate crucial environmental resources to matters of mere preference is another.
This answer to the dilemma, however, raises a second potential objection, to wit, that teaching about justice within the educational curriculum is not permitted because it undermines the standard of legitimacy upon which political liberalism replies. A version of this criticism is articulated by Brighouse (1998) . Brighouse objects to the kind of model of civic education -the more expansive version -that I have been defending here; namely, one that seeks to shape the political motivations of individuals by, among other things, teaching about the content of what justice requires. Such a model goes beyond simply providing individuals with the skills to reflect rationally and critically on political matters, and to participate in the political process, should they choose to. At first it looked like Rawls's model was the latter kind; I have argued it is closer to the former, especially when environmental justice is considered.
Brighouse objects that shaping the political motivations of individuals via an education about justice undermines legitimacy because, by definition, legitimacy requires free, informed, and rational consent. Teaching about justice skews the outcome in favour of itself. It is hardly surprising that individuals 'consent' to a conception of justice they have already been indoctrinated into. This is hardly free and rational consent, the objection goes. To illustrate this, Brighouse gives two criteria by which legitimacy can be measured. The first is that political arrangements must be such that citizens would consent to them if they were reasonable, possessed of sufficient information, and capable of reasoning in a manner that was not overly self-interested. Brighouse's worry here is that this hypothetical consent is too easily attained.
Thus, he adds the second criterion, that there must also be actual consent given by the governed (and that this too must be free, rational, and informed (Rawls 1971, pp.114-117) . Dworkin adopts a form of 'associative duties' to ground consent (1986) . And Raz utilizes a mechanism to generate an obligation to obey the law where complying with a given law enables an individual to better act on her reason for actions than not complying with it (1988). Second, on a proper and plausible account of legitimacy it is not correct that hypothetical consent is too easily attained. An account that rests on stringent ideals of justice and democracy will place significant demands on political principles and institutions, not ones that are weak and easily met (see Clayton 2006, p.134) .
If this broad reply to the charge that justice-based concerns cannot be taught as part of a compulsory education for fear of undermining legitimacy is correct, then not only can important aspects of environmentalism be taught, but they must be. They must be, because they form a basic requirement of learning about the fair terms of social cooperation.
Finally, I want to turn to consider in slightly more detail, exactly what can be taught under the rubric of environmental justice consistent with a political liberal educational curriculum, and what gets left out. It is inevitable that some things will get left out. Not everything that is of concern to environmentalism will be subsumable within the category of primary social goods; not every environmentalist concern with be a concern of justice. Some things will remain beyond justice; that is, matters that are more appropriately conceived of as part of a broader conception of the good. This is not necessarily regrettable. To say something is not a consideration of justice is not to say that it does not matter. It may well matter on other grounds, and it may well matter more. Indeed, it has been my purpose to argue that other attempts to reconcile environmental conceptions of justice and liberal -particularly political liberal -conceptions of political morality include too little of the former, such that they are unappealing to environmentalists. The reconciliation I have defended here has sought to include a wider array -the proper array -of environmental goods, though not everything. Identifying what should be included, however, is a tricky business. What is clear from our understanding of the environment and the scientific processes behind it, is that we still understand relatively little about its myriad causal mechanisms and their interrelatedness. The provision of a decent environment as a precondition to the effective realisation of other primary goods will cover many concerns, but it will also leave some outside. This is because the composition of what constitutes a decent or sufficient environment will be complex and may take many varied forms. Under one schema a particular species might be essential, under another it might not be. It is only a requirement of justice that such a decent environment be provided so as to facilitate the realisation of the other parts of the view. The specifics of how such a schema is to be fleshed out is not something that is set out directly by a conception of justice. Given the complexity of the environment, we may need to assume that many apparently unconnected aspects of the ecosystem play an integral part in maintaining a decent environment.
A simple analogy helps. A basic duty of parenting is the duty to provide one's child with a nutritious diet. I shall assume, for the sake of argument, that vegetarianism is not morally required. So long as the diet meets the basic criteria for being considered nutritious it does not matter what the component parts are. Thus, there is no particular reason to provide one's child with chicken so long as the necessary nutrients that would be obtained from chicken (primarily protein) are obtained from other food sources (soya, milk, red meat, eggs, beans, and so forth).
How we flesh out the set of goods that comprises a nutritious diet is up to us as parents.
However, given the various food groups and nutrients that are essential to a healthy diet, and the limited numbers of foods available, any adequate schema is likely to overlap significantly with any other. Similarly, how we flesh out the package of environmental goods that we need to lead decent lives is likely to vary, but whichever is endorsed it is likely to overlap significantly with any alternative.
IV Conclusion
My aim has been straightforward: to argue that a strong environmentalist ethic and the educational curriculum it is often thought to demand is, in large part, compatible with the very stringent requirements of a political liberal framework and the constraints it places upon civic education. I have aimed to achieve this reconciliation by arguing that environmental goods -and the values that surround them -are more accurately and appropriately conceived of as primary social goods, not belief systems. As such, they fall under the heading of socioeconomic justice, not conceptions of the good. Proponents of political liberalism need only endorse an antiperfectionist stance with regard to conceptions of the good. About questions of justice they can endorse a partisan view that promotes distributive schemes of environmental goods, and which can legitimately be taught in the classroom as part of a national curriculum with the aim of creating greener citizens.
